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Compulsion That Violates the Fifth
Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition
Larry J. Ritchie*
I. INTRODUCTION
A few years ago Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote: "At this
point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the
concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads: 'No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ....

A more accurate statement

.' "

might have been made by transposing the words "concept" and
"language" and inserting in the place of "schoolboy," the word
"lawyer." Indeed, only ten years earlier the Court mentioned
that "the law and the lawyers .

.

. have never made up their

minds just what [the fifth amendment] is supposed to do or just
whom it is intended to protect."2
In interpreting the bounds of the fifth amendment privilege, the Court has clearly defined much of its language. "No
person" means that the privilege applies only to an individual,
not to a corporation or other business entity.3 "In any criminal
case" would seem to suggest that compelling an individual to be
a witness against himself is forbidden only in his criminal trial,
but the Court has reasoned that in order to protect fully the
rights of the accused at trial, the privilege must be extended to
5
certain other proceedings, 4 for example, grand jury proceedings,
police custodial interrogations, 6 and even to activities outside the
criminal process, such as civil proceedings, 7 investigations by administrative officials,8 and legislative committee hearings. 9 The
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974).
2. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964)
(quoting from Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and
Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. AToM. Sc. 181-82 (1953)).
3. E.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974).
4. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
5. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
*

8. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
9. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
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privilege would be nullified if the state could require the suspect
to give testimony at other proceedings which might eventually
be used as evidence against him at a criminal trial. 10
"To be a witness" means the act of testifying or giving
testimony. The Court has limited the privilege to evidence
that is testimonial or communicative in nature;" it "offers no
protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or
to make a particular gesture."'1 2 And it is being a witness
"against himself" that cannot be c6mpelled.13 A person can be
compelled to disclose information about the crimes of others, for
14
providing such evidence is a duty of citizenship.
The critical language, "shall be compelled," however, has
not been defined as consistently as the other phrases of the
amendment. It is clear that only the government is forbidden
from exerting compulsion, for the amendment does not regulate
the actions of private individuals.' 5 But because "compulsion"
is a vague concept, the precise nature of the proscribed governmental activity has been subject to shifting interpretations. In
recent years the Burger Court 16 has frequently dealt with the
concept in such a way as to alter significantly previous definitions
of forbidden governmental action, especially those developed by
10. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
11. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
12. Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
13. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600
(1896).
14. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973); United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14, 692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). In Burr, Chief
Justice Marshall drew on English precedents for the long-accepted proposition that "the public has a right to every man's evidence."
15. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976); id. at 332
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
16. Warren Burger became Chief Justice on June 23, 1969. The
other members of the Court at that time were Justices Black, Douglas,
Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall. (Justice Fortas's seat
was vacant as a result of his resignation.) Throughout this Article, decisions characterized as "Burger Court" decisions refer to those handed
down after the Chief Justice took office, although the individual members
of the Court have, of course, changed since 1969. This Article concentrates, however, on the most recent decisions, which tend to reflect a
firm majority acceptance of the changing view of the fifth amendment.
The current Court is composed of Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens.
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the policy-oriented Warren Court. The present Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment narrowly focuses on the amendment's historical purpose, thereby restricting the protections that
the privilege could afford.
The history of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination has been thoroughly documented, 17 and the policy justifications for the adoption, extension, and contraction of the privilege have been frequently discussed and debated.' 8 In Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission,19 the Warren Court listed the then
recognized policies underlying the privilege:
The privilege against self-incrimination ...reflects many of our
fundamental values and most noble aspirations: Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load," . . .; our
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that
the privilege, while sometimes20"a shelter to the guilty," is often
"a protection to the innocent."
The Burger Court, however, has disregarded these policy-based
considerations and focused almost exclusively on the major intention of the framers of the Constitution. In England the
privilege was regarded as a mere rule of evidence. 2' In the
United States it was elevated to a constitutional right in order to
ensure an adversary or accusatorial system of criminal justice
and to avoid the inquisitorial practices of the English Courts of
Star Chamber and High Commission. 22 Those courts, seeking
evidence to be used against a suspect, would command his
appearance, place him under oath, and interrogate him. His
answers could be used against him as evidence of a criminal
offense. A guilty suspect who attempted to avoid self-accusa17.

See, e.g., L.

J. WIGMORE,EVIDENCE

LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrTH AIENDMENT

§ 2250 (J.McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).

(1968); 8

18. See, e.g., E. GRIswoLn, THE FFTr AMENDMENT TODAY (1955);
L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FiFT AMENDMENT (1959); 8 WIGMORE,

supra note 17, § 2251; Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The
Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV.671 (1968).
19.

378 U.S. 52 (1964).

20. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
21. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
22. E.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1976); Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 439-40 (1974).
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tion by lying was caught in another trap-his answers could be
used against him as evidence of perjury. If he simply refused to
answer, he could be held in contempt of court and imprisoned
until he was ready to speak. 23 This was the so-called "cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt. '24 By focusing on this historical justification for the privilege 25 and ignoring
other policy considerations, the Burger Court has narrowly defined the prohibited compulsion and gradually reversed the Warren Court's expansion of the scope of the privilege. This Article
will examine the Burger Court's treatment of the privilege and
describe its potential effects in specific situations in which a
privilege claim may be raised. The first part of the Article will
discuss the Court's literal reading of the language of the fifth
amendment through an examination of cases dealing with immunity and compelled production of documents. Having concluded that the Court is narrowly focusing on proscribing the
use of compelled testimony, rather than on the act of compelling
it, the Article will then discuss the Court's treatment of an
assertion of the privilege by a criminal defendant, by an arrestee,
and by a grand jury witness.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE

A. THE ACT OF COMPULSION vs. THE USE OF

CoMPELLED

TESTI-

MONY
The language of the fifth amendment, "No person ...
shall be compelled," suggests that it is the act of compulsion that
is forbidden. But the modifying phrase, "to be a witness against
himself," limits the prohibition: a person can be compelled to
give information, unless in so doing he would disclose information that could be used against him. The Burger Court's
focus on this limitation is the foundation upon which its narrowing of the scope of the privilege rests.
23. See 8 WIGMom, supra note 17, § 2250.
24. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
25. The historical perspective of the Burger Court seems to be correct. See Pittman, The Colonial and ConstitutionalHistory of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. Rnv. 763 (1935).
Decisions interpreting the privilege based only on English and colonial
history, however, ignore or treat too lightly recent judicially developed
policy justifications for the privilege, which attempt to ensure a responsive constitutional system basically consistent with the desires of the
framers, who could not anticipate the variety of confrontations between
the state and the individual in modern times.
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For many years the Supreme Court has held that compelling even self-incriminating testimony by a threat of imprisonment for contempt does not violate the fifth amendment, as
long as immunity co-extensive with the scope of the privilege
is granted.26 Immunity accommodates both the "imperatives"
of the privilege and the "legitimate demands" of the government
to compel testimony, 27 for unless a person's compelled testimony
can be introduced as evidence against him in a criminal prosecu28
tion, the privilege is not infringed.
But interpretations of the type of immunity necessary to
protect the privilege have changed. In 1892, the Court indicated that a witness must be fully protected by "absolute immunity"
from prosecution for the offense to which a question relates. 29 In
1972, in Kastigar v. United States,s0 the Burger Court repudiat26. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
27. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
28. Id. at 448-49.
29. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). In Counselman, the Court was faced with the government's contention that use immunity, granted under the Immunity Act of 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37, was
sufficient to protect the fifth amendment right. The Court ordered a witness, in custody for refusal to answer questions after the statutory immunity was granted, discharged, stating that "[w ]e are clearly of the opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the
effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the
United States." 142 U.S. at 585. Very shortly after the Counselman decision, Congress drafted a transactional immunity statute designed to
protect a person compelled to testify from prosecution "for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify or
produce evidence. . . ." Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, 444. In
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Supreme Court
indicated that at least in some circumstances a grant of transactional immunity was not required. Murphy involved the possible federal use of
evidence obtained after state immunity was granted in a state investigative hearing. After holding that a state cannot compel testimony from a
witness threatened with subsequent federal prosecution, the Court concluded, "that in order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited
from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits." 378
U.S. at 79. See also notes 30-31 infra and accompanying text.
30. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigarthe Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 927 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003
(1970)), which provided only for use immunity: a witness compelled
to testify could subsequently be prosecuted but no direct or indirect use
of his compelled testimony could be made. The Court held the statute
valid on the premise that transactional immunity affords broader protec-
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ed this doctrine by holding that "use immunity" is "co-extensive
with the privilege."' 3 1 A person granted use immunity must
testify and answer incriminating questions or face a citation for
contempt,3 2 but neither his compelled testimony nor its fruits
can be used by the government as evidence against him in a
criminal trial.3 3 Although he can be prosecuted, incriminating
evidence must be secured from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. 34 The Court thus views
the fifth amendment strictly as a protection against the state's
use of compelled testimony, rather than as a protection against
the act of compulsion itself.3 5

Use immunity fulfills what the

Burger Court sees as the primary constitutional purpose of the
privilege: preserving an accusatorial system of justice in which
the government must prove its case without the use of evidence
36
forced from the mouth of the accused.
This interpretation of the fifth amendment is also reflected
in the "economic penalty" cases, in which the threat of being
fired or losing government licenses or contracts for refusal to
testify compels a person to incriminate himself. The Court has
prohibited use of such testimony in a criminal prosecution, 37
tion than the constitutional privilege requires, and thus, "such immunity
from use and derivative use is co-extensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." 406 U.S. at 453.
For a history of immunity and Supreme Court cases dealing with
it, see Dixon, Comment on Immunity Provisions, 2 WomaNG PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS

1405

(1970).
31. 406 U.S. at 453.
32. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
33. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). See also
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), stating that the privilege extends not only to answers that would themselves support a conviction, but also to those which would "furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed" for prosecution.
34. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
35. In Kastigarthe Court stated:
[The fifth amendment privilege's] sole concern is to afford
protection against being "forced to give testimony leading to
the infliction of 'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.'" Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this

protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using

the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures
that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
406 U.S. at 453 (footnote omitted).
36. For a discussion of this as one of the principles underlying the
fifth amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).

37. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).

The recognition
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which may be characterized as "informal use immunity" since
the protection is not conferred on the witness prior to testifying
but by a motion to suppress at his criminal trial. In addition, a
witness cannot be forced to execute a waiver of immunity prior
to testifying by the threat of a job loss. 38 But a state employee
can be fired for failure to answer questions relating to the performance of his official duties. 3 9 This is apparently inconsistent
in Garrity and in more recent cases, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308 (1976); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), of an exclusionary rule to protect the privilege is in sharp
contrast to the cases in which the Court has criticized and weakened the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976);
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The appropriateness and wisdom of a particular remedy, however, must depend on the nature of the underlying right protected by that remedy. The fifth amendment by its very
language seems to incorporate the remedy of exclusion, see United States
v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. at 3027, the only effective remedy in the Garrity situation.
38. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation
Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Gardner
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). See note 39 infra.
The Court has mentioned the possibility that Garrity would nullify
the effect of any waiver of immunity executed by a witness in response
to such compulsion, but the issue has not yet been decided. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 278-79 (1968).
39. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278 (1968). In Leykowitz the Supreme Court held
four New York statutes, which required government contractors to waive
their immunity or face cancellation of their contracts and disqualification
from future government contracts for five years, unconstitutional. In addition to holding the statutes invalid, the Court indicated that "given
adequate immunity, the State may plainly insist that employees either
answer questions under oath about the performance of their job or suffer
the loss of employment." 414 U.S. at 84. The contractors in Lefkowitz
could have been fired for refusal to answer questions put to them, as long
as they were not required to waive immunity, and the threatened job loss
for a refusal to answer would have constituted compulsion under Garrity.
Evidence thus obtained would be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal
proceeding against the contractor. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967). Compare Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551
(1956) with Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) and Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.
83 (1953).
The Lefkowitz position is also implicit in other decisions. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657, 660 n.14, 662 n.16 (1976);
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 472, 475 (1975) (White, J., concurring).
In Maness, the Court reversed a contempt citation imposed on a lawyer
who advised his client to rely on the fifth amendment and refuse to turn
over material subpoenaed by a grand jury. The Court was concerned
that turning over the material would "let the cat out of the bag" with
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with the view expressed by the Warren Court in Spevack v.
Klein,40 where, without discussing informal use immunity,41 the
Court held that a lawyer who refused to testify at a bar disciplinary proceeding could not be penalized by disbarment for invoking the privilege. 42

In Lefkowitz v. Turey,4 3 the Burger

no assurance of being able to put it back in, because no formal immunity
had been granted and there were no state procedures that would permit
suppression of the material at trial had the privilege in fact been violated. That being the case, the lawyer recommended in good faith that
his client invoke the privilege and the Court reasoned that he should
not be held in contempt for doing so. 419 U.S. at 462-63, 462 nm.
9-10, 467-68. Implicit in the Court's analysis, and explicit in Justice White's concurrence, 419 U.S. at 473-74, is the recognition that if the
defendant had been informed of his immunity, he would have been
required to answer questions put to him or suffer the consequences of
his refusal.
The informal use immunity remedy would seem in many instances to do away with statutory procedures that require a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry to apply to his superiors for
authority to grant formal immunity to a witness. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 6003(b) (1970). Loss of protections now insured by statutory requirements, however, could be remedied by the formulation of procedures within the prosecutor's office to prevent a "runaway" prosecutor from taking action without the approval of his superiors.
40. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
41. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), see note 37 supra
and accompanying text, was decided the same day as Spevack. Justice
White, dissenting in both cases, pointed out that the Spevack decision
provided an unnecessary protection to lawyers in light of the Garrity
rule. His reasoning was similar to the reasoning used in Leflcowitz, see
note 39 supra,also written by him. Justice White noted that the Spevack
decision
would seem justifiable only on the ground that it is an essential measure to protect against self-incrimination-to prevent
what may well be a successful attempt to elicit incriminating
admissions. But Garrity excludes such statements, and their
fruits, from a criminal proceeding and therefore frustrates in
advance any effort to compel admission which could be used
to obtain a criminal conviction. I therefore see little legal or
practical basis, in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment, for preventing the discharge of a public employee or the disbarment of a lawyer
who refuses to talk about the performance of his public duty.
385 U.S. at 531 (footnote omitted).
42. The broad language used by the Spevack Court indicates
a concern for preventing the act of compulsion. The Court's analysis
begins by citing language from Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which
emphasizes "'the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence.'" 385 U.S. at 514 (citation omitted). The
Court then explains the nature of this "penalty" stating: "In this context
'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said
in Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609, the imposition of any sanction which
makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly." 385 U.S.
at 515 (emphasis added).
Justice Fortas, who concurred with the result in Spevack, wrote a
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Court summarized its position without mentioning Spevack:
[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to
answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use
of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any
Absubsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant ....
sent such protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to answer,
his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal
prosecution....
[E]mployees of the state . . . may be compelled to respond to
questions about the performance of their duties but only if their
answers cannot be used against them in subsequent criminal
prosecutions. . . .44
The question left open by Lefkowitz is whether a witness
who has not been granted formal immunity and refuses to testify
can avoid both disclosure and the threatened action of the state.
It would be consistent with the Burger Court's rigorously literal
view of the fifth amendment to permit the state to force disclosure, even without formally granting immunity. A motion to
suppress at a subsequent criminal trial would provide sufficient
protection. This interpretation of the effect of the privilege
accommodates society's need for information, but rejects the notion that the fifth amendment is a "general protector" of pri46
vacy 45 or that the act of compulsion is the evil it addressed.
The Burger Court's reliance on this interpretation is most
explicitly demonstrated in the recent case of Baxter v. Palmigiano.4 ' Baxter held that a prison disciplinary board may permissibly draw an inference of guilt from an inmate's refusal to
separate opinion, reasoning that lawyers had no public duty to account
to the state for their actions. He indicated that if the case had involved
a state employee he would have allowed the state's coercive action. Using Fortas's rationale, Spevack is not inconsistent with the reasoning of
Lefkowitz and other cases, see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
43. 414 U.S. 70 (1973). See note 39 supra.
44. 414 U.S. at 78-79.
45. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
46. In addition to the immunity and economic penalty cases discussed above, several other cases lend some support to this proposition.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225 (1975); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). These
cases generally stand for the proposition that an accused cannot contest
the compulsion of testimony or material from a third person. If the act
of compulsion were prohibited by the privilege, then the accused would
be able to claim the fifth amendment privilege when evidence compelled
from a third person was introduced against the accused at trial. Clearly,
Fisher, Nobles, and Couch would not permit such a claim, nor does the
language of the amendment itself. Compare Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969) with People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855

(1955).
47.

425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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testify. The Court distinguished Griffin v. California,48 which
had held that neither prosecutor nor judge could urge the jury to
draw such an inference from a criminal defendant's refusal to
49
testify at his trial:
The State has not, contrary to Griffin, sought to make eviden-

tiary use of his silence at the disciplinary hearing in any criminal proceeding. Neither has Rhode Island insisted or asked that
Palmigiano waive his Fifth Amendment privilege ....

This

does not smack of an invalid attempt by the State to compel
testimony without
granting immunity or to penalize the exercise
of the privilege. 50
The Court seems to reason that although the prison board's
drawing an adverse inference may have amounted to compelling
the inmate to testify, or penalizing his exercise of the privilege, it
was not the sort of compulsion or penalty forbidden by the fifth
amendment. Since only a civil proceeding was involved no
compelled testimony was being used against the accused in a
criminal prosecution. 51
Even if the privilege is not interpreted to prohibit the act of
compulsion, the due process clause, of course, limits the type of
coercive conduct in which the government may engage; it may
be to this clause that the Burger Court will turn to review certain
types of coercive conduct that might once have been analyzed
within the framework of the fifth amendment privilege. 52 Governmental compulsion must not offend the community's sense of
decency and must comport with fundamental notions of fair48. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
49. For a fuller discussion of Griffin, see text accompanying notes
82-85 infra.
50. 425 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added).
51. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 326-27 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), in which Justice Brennan argues that the act of compelling testimony, as well as use of that testimony in a criminal case, is forbidden by the fifth amendment privilege.
Justice Brennan would allow testimony to be compelled by incarceration
in immunity cases (although he would require transactional immunity)
as long as the witness was informed of the existence of immunity at the
time of the questioning. -425 U.S. at 335-36.
Informing the accused of his immunity in advance of his testimony,
or demonstrating that he knew he would be immunized against use of
his answers, would seem unimportant if the privilege were designed
merely to protect the adversary system. The witness's subjective state
of mind is relevant only to assessing the psychological pressure on the
witness, or the degree of compulsion exerted. As long as the compulsion
does not produce information that is used against the witness, the adversary system is protected and the privilege is not violated. Brennan's
analysis therefore emphasizes other policies underlying the fifth amendment privilege.
52. See text accompanying notes 113-35 infra.
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ness. 53 Thus, police torture of a defendant would not violate
the fifth amendment privilege if the resulting confession were
not used against him, but would violate the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Compelling testimony
by disbarment, job loss, or incarceration does not violate the
privilege, if combined with adequate immunity, but could violate due process if the degree of compulsion were sufficiently
high. The case law seems to indicate, however, that even imprisonment for refusal to answer questions after formal use immunity has been granted is not a due process violation,54 perhaps on
the theory that a witness could easily secure his release simply by
answering the questions.

B. COMPULSION TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AND PRIVATE PAPERS
The Burger Court's analysis of the application of the privilege to documents and private writings not only reconfirms its
literal interpretation of the privilege, but clearly indicates the
extent to which that interpretation dilutes the privacy protection
that the privilege could afford.55 Certain documents, such as
business records, letters, or a diary, may be testimonial or communicative and certainly can be as incriminating as the spoken
word; thus, such documents should be protected by the privilege.55 The Burger Court recently analyzed the scope of that
53. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
54. See generally Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
55. That one of the principles underlying the privilege is the protection of privacy has been enunciated in a number of Supreme Court
decisions. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), for example, the Court stated that the privilege reflects "our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and the right of each individual
'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.'" Id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (1956), rev'd, 353
U.S. 391 (1957)). See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Boyd v. United
States, 116'U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Justice Brennan, concurring in Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976), noted that the Court's precedents stood for the proposition that protection of personal privacy was
not merely a by-product, but a "factor controlling in part the determination of the scope of the privilege." Id. at 416.
56. The suggestion that private papers were shielded from forced
disclosure was first made in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886):
".... a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the
owner of goods sought to be forfeited . . . is compelling him to be a
witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution." Id. at 634-35. This pronouncement was reiterated or
approved in a long line of cases, see, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 377 (1911); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944);
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protection in Fisher v. United States57 and Andresen v. Mary58
land.
In Fisher, the Internal Revenue Service issued subpoenas
duces tecum to several lawyers, directing them to produce their
clients' accountants' work papers, which .were in the attorneys'
possession. Each attorney refused to comply, and the government brought enforcement actions. The attorneys claimed that
the privilege against self-incrimination gave them the right to
refuse to turn over the documents. The Court held that if any
compulsion existed, it was exerted on the lawyers, not the taxpayers. Since the privilege protects the accused,59 the taxpayer's
fifth amendment rights were not violated. The attorney-client
privilege, however, would shield against disclosure of documents
transferred to a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
if the client himself could have invoked the fifth amendment to
refuse to produce them.6 0
In determining whether the taxpayer could have claimed the
privilege, the Court recognized two forms of testimonial compulsion: compulsion to create the document and thus "testify"
in writing, and compulsion to produce the subpoenaed document. After finding that the papers prepared by the accountant
contained no testimonial declarations by the taxpayer, the Court
noted that even if this were not the case, the documents were
voluntarily written; production was the only thing compelled.
The Court also acknowledged that the act of producing the
papers had communicative aspects, and could be construed as
"testimonial" on two grounds: production both implicitly authenticates the documents as those subpoenaed and admits
the existence of the documents and the taxpayer's control or
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974). For a general discussion of the protection of private papers, see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See generally 59 MmNN. L. Rsv. 751 (1975).
58.

59.
(1973)).

427 U.S. 463 (1976).

425 U.S. at 397 (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328

60. 425 U.S. at 404. The Court notes that "[w]here the transfer is
made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the purposes of the attorney-client privilege would be defeated unless the privilege is applicable."
Id. The privilege was limited to situations where the client had fifth
amendment protection, however, because in any other situation "even absent the attorney-client privilege, clients will not be discouraged from
disclosing the documents to the attorney and their ability to obtain informed legal advice will remain unfettered." Id.
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possession of them. The Court held, however, that since the
accountants had prepared the documents, the taxpayers were not
"competent" to authenticate them. 61 And since it is not illegal
to possess accountants' work papers, the admission of existence
and possession poses no threat of testimonial incrimination. The
subpoena commanding production therefore did not compel the
taxpayers to incriminate themselves, even though the contents of
the documents were incriminating.
The Court's discussion of the circumstances in which compelled production is permissible reconfirms its basic view of the
scope of the privilege. Although the witness may be forced to
produce documentary evidence by a subpoena duces tecum, as
long as no testimonial aspects of that act are used as evidence
against him in a criminal prosecution (for example, as authentication), his privilege is preserved. But beyond its reconfirmation
of this view in the context of documentary subpoenas, Fisher
had other implications. Although the Court expressly disclaimed
reaching the issue of the fifth amendment's application to private
papers, since no such papers were involved in the case, 2 nevertheless, its emphasis on the fact that the documents were voluntarily written 63 clearly suggested that private papers enjoyed no
special protected status. As previous Supreme Court cases have
suggested, 4 however, the testimonial content of private writings
61. 425 U.S. at 413. Whether this statement is accurate from an evidentiary point of view is not as certain as the Court seems to believe.
See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 222, 224, 225, &228 (2d ed. 1972).
62. 425 U.S. at 414.
63. Id. at 409-10.
64. See note 56 supra. Justice Marshall, concurring in Fisher,characterized the majority opinion as a "wholly new approach" to the analysis of documentary production. 425 U.S. at 430. He stated:
The Fifth Amendment basis for resisting production of a
document pursuant to subpoena, the Court tells us today, lies
not in the document's contents, as we previously have suggested, but in the tacit verification inherent in the act of production itself that the document exists, is in the possession of
the producer, and is the one sought by the subpoena.
This technical and somewhat esoteric focus on the testimonial elements of production rather than on the content of
the evidence the investigator seeks is ... contrary to the

history and traditions of the privilege against self-incrimination both in this country and in England, where the privilege
originated.
Id. at 431.
Marshall, nevertheless, tried to reconcile the majority's approach
with the need for continued protection of private papers, noting that under the majority's rationale, since production would verify the existence
of private documents, and there was an "inverse relationship between
the private nature of a document and the permissibility of assuming its
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logically seems to entitle them to greater protection than that
accorded ordinary objects, or writings that have been communicated to others. Fisher implied nonetheless that private papers
would be shielded only from forced production, as the Court
defined production, not from compelled disclosure.
This apparent narrowing of the privacy interests protected
by the fifth amendment was later made explicit in Andresen v.
Maryland.6 5 A lawyer's private business records, notes, and
communications were seized pursuant to the execution of a valid
search warrant. The Court held that since the records were
voluntarily written, they were not compelled; since the police
seized them, there was no compelled production; and since they
were authenticated at trial by a handwriting expert, the defendant was not compelled to authenticate them. The Court reasoned that while the fifth amendment prevents compelling a person to aid in furnishing incriminating evidence, it does not shield
private information from disclosure; 66 the lawyer whose office
was searched was not subjected to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury, or contempt.
existence," the very act of admitting that the private papers existed
would be testimonial and therefore subject to a claim of privilege. Id.
at 433.
Even under the rationale of earlier cases, however, private papers
would be subject to special protection only if they were kept strictly
private; if written or spoken thoughts are freely and voluntarily conveyed to another, they lose their claim to protected status. Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332 (1973). Nevertheless, third persons
may not be forced to disclose certain communications protected by other
evidentiary privileges-such as the attorney-client privilege invoked in
Fisher,or the marital or doctor-patient privileges.
The free and voluntary disclosure rationale underlies the '!misplaced
trust" cases in which an accused confides in an informer or a government
agent and reveals incriminatory information. He is not compelled to do
so. In such situations, the Court has rejected assertions that a party has
a constitutionally protected expectation that the person with whom he
converses is not a government agent. See, e.g., United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
65. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
66. In Fisher, which the Court relied upon in Andresen, the Court
said that:
Insofar as private information not obtained through compelled
self-incriminating testimony is legally protected, its protection
stems from other sources-the Fourth Amendment's protection
against seizures without warrant or probable cause and against
subpoenas which suffer from "too much indefiniteness or
breadth in the things required to be 'particularly described'"
...

; the First Amendment .

.

. ; or evidentiary privileges

such as the attorney-client privilege.
425 U.S. at 401 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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The determining factor in the applicability of the privilege
to documents has long been thought to be their content. 7 Private papers clearly contain "testimonial" evidence; unlike real
evidence (the gun, mask, or contract) or identification evidence
(fingerprints or voice recognition), private writings derive from
the mind of the accused, and are a "mere physical extension of
[his] thoughts and knowledge."6 8 In Fisher and Andresen, the
Burger Court appears to be disregarding the testimonial nature
of private papers and drawing an artificial distinction between
speech and writing: the privilege prohibits compelling a person
to speak and incriminate himself but does not prohibit compelled
revelation of written thoughts.
Perhaps the Court has taken too literally the maxim that
the privilege protects the accused from being convicted on evidence forced "out of his own mouth," 69 for the apparent distinction between speech and writing is highly suspect. Compelling
a person to write out evidence to be used against him in his
criminal prosecution, for instance, is obviously as unconstitutional as compelling him to deliver the evidence orally. But under
the Burger Court's rationale, the person who "voluntarily" keeps
an account of his criminal activities in a private diary or a sole
proprietor who keeps a personal account of his illegal as well as
his legal business transactions is not protected from disclosure of
these written records. If the privilege was designed to safeguard
against an inquisitorial system that forces an individual to reveal his private mental activity, then Justice Brennan's comments in his concurring opinion in Fisherring true:
Many of the matters within an individual's knowledge may as
easily be retained within his head as set down on a scrap of
paper. I perceive no principle which does not permit compelling
one to disclose the contents of one's mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that scrap of paper by
compelling its production. Under a contrary view, the constitutional protection would turn on fortuity, and persons would, at
their peril, record their thoughts and the events of their lives.
The ability to think private thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen
and paper, and the ability to preserve intimate memories would
be curtailed through fear that those thoughts or the events of
those memories would become
the subjects of criminal sanctions
however invalidly imposed.70
67. See notes 56 & 64 supra.
68. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 486 (1976)
dissenting).
69. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
70. 425 U.S. at 420.

(Brennan, J.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:383

It may be that the Court in Andresen, despite its reliance
on the voluntary creation of the documents, was not drawing the
artificial distinction between spoken and written self-incrimination attributed to it above, but rather was reasoning that
a "lawful" search does not involve "compulsion" because the
witness is not forced to "aid in the discovery, production, or
authentication of [the] incriminating evidence." 71 It is true
that an individual is not literally forced to perform the testimonial act of producing papers seized pursuant to a valid search
warrant. But, as Brennan points out in his dissent,72 a search
warrant, like a subpoena, is merely a means of using the legal
process to force a person to disclose self-incriminating knowledge. Compulsion is certainly present whether Andresen hands
boxes of records to the authorities or stands by and watches
while they are carted away in a lawful search. The Court's approach sanctions the "circumvention" of the fifth amendment, to
use the phrase of Justice Brennan, who said: "[A] privilege protecting against the compelled production of testimonial material
is a hollow guarantee where production of that material may be
secured through the expedient of search and seizure."73
III.

APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE

Although the Burger Court's strict reading of the fifth
amendment appears to be based on an accurate assessment of
the principal intent of its framers, it may not be simply a
rejection of policy-based interpretations that previous Courts
used to expand the scope of the privilege; it may be one aspect
of a different policy-based interpretation that assigns greater
weight to society's need for information about criminal activities.
That this apparent shift in values is the cause, rather than the
result, of the Court's historical interpretation, is evidenced by the
Court's attempts to delineate permissible government conduct in
situations within the scope of the privilege. The remainder of
this Article will explore the Court's treatment of the privilege
when asserted by a criminal defendant at trial, an accused under
interrogation, and a witness before a grand jury.
71. 427 U.S. at 473-74. The Court stated: "Finally we do not believe
that permitting the introduction into evidence of a person's business records seized during an otherwise lawful search would offend or undermine any of the policies underlying the privilege." Id. at 475-76 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 485-89.
73. Id. at 486.
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THE RIGHT OF A DEFENDANT

The Right to Silence

At the heart of the fifth amendment is the defendant's
privilege not to take the stand in his criminal prosecution. The
privilege against self-incrimination applies to any fact that can
be used in a proceeding aimed at charging the person with a
specific crime: thus the accused in a criminal case need not
answer any questions, for "at least on the prosecution's assumption, [all answers] are incriminating." 74 A defendant cannot
even be called to be sworn.75 Thus, the literal language of the
fifth amendment ensuring freedom from compulsion also grants
a criminal defendant the right to remain silent at trial.
If the defendant does choose to testify at trial, he must
answer all questions addressed to him by the prosecutor or the
judge.70 He may not selectively refuse to answer certain questions because the answers might be incriminating:
8 WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2260.
75. Id. § 2268 (2). Cf. White v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965)
(co-defendant cannot call other co-defendant to the stand).
76. There may be an exception for questions about the defendant's
criminal activities for which he has not been tried and which are unrelated to the charges at issue, asked solely for the purpose of impeaching
his credibility. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b), which provides that giving testimony by an accused or other witness does not operate as a waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination when the witness is examined
with respect to matters relating only to credibility. McCormick and
Wigmore suggest that one standard by which to measure the extent of
a waiver by a testifying witness is to assume that he waives the privilege
completely as to all aspects of the offense with which he is charged. C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 131 (1954); 8 WiGMORE, supra note 17, § 2276.
This view is not universally accepted, however
If there is good reason why a defendant should not be compelled to be a witness against himself, there ought to be equally
good reason why, if he has testified voluntarily upon one issue,
he should not be compelled to testify against his will concerning matters wholly unrelated to that issue, which would not be
within the scope of proper cross-examination if he were an
ordinary witness.
Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1925). See also sources
cited in 3 WINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE f 611[03]-34 n.7 (1975). As Weinstein
points out, cases such as Tucker merely assume that the scope of the
privilege is co-extensive with the permissible scope of cross-examination,
without inquiring whether the policy of the privilege is best served by
compelling the defendant to respond to any question once he has voluntarily testified or by allowing him to remain silent after partial disclosure. 3 WEiNsTEIN's EVIDENCE % 611[03]-36 (1975). Where wide-open
cross-examination is permitted and the witness does not determine the
area of disclosure, a more searching inquiry as to whether the accused
may refuse to answer certain questions on the stand is needed.
74.
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[A witness who testified voluntarily] cannot reasonably claim
that the Fifth Amendment gives him not only this choice [to
refuse to testify] but, if he elects to testify, an immunity from
cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute.
It would make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.77
A defendant who elects to testify is sometimes said to have
waived the privilege. 78 The term "waiver" may accurately refer
to a knowing and intelligent renunciation of a right,70 but in this
situation the defendant's relinquishment of the right is in a sense
imposed on him. Failure to take the stand may lead the jury,
unaided by suggestions from the prosecutor or the judge, to infer
guilt, even if instructed not to do so.s0 Nevertheless, forcing a

defendant to elect between testifying completely and not taking
the stand at all is not forbidden compulsion, for no other procedure can satisfactorily protect all of the defendant's rights.8 '
2.

Penalizing the Exercise of the Right

While the desire to respond to the government's evidence is
inherent in any trial system, the state may introduce into that
77. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958). See also
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Fitzpatrick v. United
States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900). In Caminetti the Court stated that the accused who chooses to take the stand "may not stop short in his testimony
by omitting and failing to explain incriminating circumstances and
events already in evidence, in which he participated and concerning
which he is fully informed, without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be naturally drawn from it." Id. at 494. The sanction for the
testifying defendant who refuses to tell all could be adverse comment
by the prosecutor and judge or a contempt citation.
78. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968)
(dictum); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); 8 WiGmoRm, supra note 17, § 2276.
79. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976).
80. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939), where the
Court discusses the notion that instructing the jury not to draw such an
inference from the defendant's silence at his trial may actually have the
opposite result of focusing the jurors' attention on the accused's silence
and lead them to speculate on the possible explanations for it, including
guilt. Cf. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 571, 572-73 (2d Cir.
1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
81. The only other protective rule would be to prohibit the defendant in all cases from testifying at his own trial-a rule which prevailed
in this country until less than a century ago. See Ferguson v. Georgia,
365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961). There were two reasons for the long life of
the disqualification rule: the possible untrustworthiness of the defendant's testimony, id. at 573-75, and the threatened erosion of the privilege
against self-incrimination if the defendant could testify. Id. at 578-79.
The harshness of not allowing a defendant to testify in his own behalf,
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system other factors that militate against remaining silent. It
may attach adverse consequences to the defendant's exercise of
the right or force him to choose between two constitutional
rights. Such practices may violate the fifth amendment by
compelling the defendant to take the stand or may be so unfair
as to violate due process guarantees. Because these constitutional
protections overlap, the Supreme Court has often failed to delineate the precise basis upon which it is deciding the constitutionality of certain state trial procedures that arguably infringe one or
both rights. A comparison of the holdings of the Warren Court
and the Burger Court in several cases involving such procedures
indicates, however, that the latter is giving greater weight to the
state's interests and, although the doctrinal basis of the decisions
remains unclear, is less inclined to extend the protections that
the fifth amendment privilege could afford.
In Griffin v. California82 the Warren Court held that the
judge or prosecutor could not comment on the accused's silence
and invite the jury to draw adverse inferences from it. This
practice was characterized as
a penalty imposed... for exercising a constitutional privilege.
It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly...
What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one
thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the83silence
of the accused into evidence against him is quite another.
Stewart noted in dissent that compulsion seemed to be the focus
of the majority's inquiry, but it was not entirely clear how the
4
defendant was "compelled" to testify, since he did not speak.

Notwithstanding Stewart's dissent, perhaps the better explanation of Griffin is that it did not involve a finding of compulsion
at all, but was based on a due process rationale.8

5

States,8 6

In Simmons v. United
the Warren Court considered a procedure in which the defendant, to establish his standhowever, spurred legislatures to enact laws granting the defendant the
right to testify. See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 598
(1961) (Frankfurter,
Justices Frankfurter
right to testify under
ess clause. Id.
82. 380 U.S. 609

J., concurring); id. at 601 (Clark, J., concurring).
and Clark felt that not allowing the accused the
oath in his own behalf would violate the due proc(1965).

83. Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 620-23.
85. See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971)

(Douglas, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941 (1972);

McCoaM m, supra note 61, § 131, at 277.
86. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:383

ing to challenge the constitutionality of a police seizure, had to
admit ownership of the property seized and thereby incriminate
himself. That testimony was later introduced against him
at trial. The Court reasoned that it "may be true" that "as an
abstract matter" there was no violation of the fifth amendment:
"A defendant is 'compelled' to testify in support of a motion to
suppress only in the sense that if he refrains from testifying he
will have to forego a benefit, and testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given to obtain
a benefit. 8 7 Nevertheless, when the benefit which the defendant might gain was another constitutional right, the necessity
of choosing between those rights created an "undeniable tension."
The Court found it "intolerable that one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another,"88 and
held that the defendant's testimony at the motion to suppress
could not be used against him at trial.8 9 The Court's language
rejecting the notion that the defendant was "compelled" suggests
that Simmons was premised largely on considerations of fundamental fairness.
The same year that Simmons was decided, the Court analyzed the validity of the Federal Kidnapping Act,90 using similar
reasoning. The statute at issue in United States v. Jackson91 gave
only the jury the power to impose the death sentence. A
defendant could plead not guilty and demand a jury trial at the
risk of receiving the death penalty, or plead guilty and be
sentenced by a judge to a term of imprisonment. 2 The appellees in Jackson had chosen a jury trial and received the death
sentence. They argued that the statutory scheme was invalid
because it made the death penalty the price of exercising their
constitutional rights. The Court agreed, holding that the sentencing provisions penalized, discouraged and chilled the de87. Id. at 393-94 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 394.
89. Id. See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 & n.16 (1964);
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951).
Justice Black, who dissented from the Court's holding in Simmons
that the defendant's testimony could not be used at trial, 390 U.S. at 395,
would have held that requiring the defendant to make such an election,
combined with the additional pressure of possibly losing a benefit, does
not compel the defendant to testify in violation of the fifth amendment.
Justice White also dissented, 390 U.S. at 399, "substantially for the reasons given by Mr. Justice Black. .. "
90.
91.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202 (1970).
390 U.S. 570 (1968).

92. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970).
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fendants' exercise of their sixth amendment right to trial by jury
and their fifth amendment right not to plead guilty.9 3 The
Court did not state expressly that a defendant would be "compelled" by the sentencing provisions to incriminate himself, and
in fact noted that the flaw in the statute was not that it coerced
4
guilty pleas but that it needlessly encouraged them.
The Burger Court's consideration of certain state trial procedures similar to those considered by the Warren Court reveals
an equally unclear analytical approach but seems to indicate
a shift in the Court's view toward state imposed penalties. In
Brady v. United States,9 5 the Court confronted the same statute
that was at issue in Jackson. The defendant, who pled guilty
before Jackson invalidated the sentencing provisions, alleged
that his plea was coerced by those provisions, thus violating his
right not to plead guilty. In upholding the validity of the plea,
the Court noted the lower court's finding that the plea was
triggered not by the fear of death, but by a co-defendant's
decision to testify against the accused. 96 Moreover, the Court
characterized the less severe sentence as a "benefit" given a
defendant who recognizes the strength of the government's case
and conserves "scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources" 9 7 by
pleading guilty; it declined to hold "that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty ....
Crampton v. Ohio,99 like Simmons, involved a claim that
the defendant could exercise one constitutional right only at the
expense of losing another. In Ohio, the jury both determined
guilt and set punishment. The defendant claimed he had a due
93. If the defendant had requested a bench trial and the prosecution
agreed, the statute would have "chilled" only the right to trial by jury.
See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
94. 390 U.S. at 583.
95. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
96. Id. at 749. This method of analysis comports with later decisions of the Court, analyzing the facts on a case-by-case basis to determine if compulsion actually occurred. Cf. text accompanying notes 17578 infra.
97. 397 U.S. at 752.
98. Id. at 751. See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

99. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Crampton is a companion case to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The formal citation would be to
McGautha, but for the sake of clarity, the case will be referred to as
Cramptonin text.
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process right to be heard on the issue of punishment without
being forced to testify on the issue of guilt. The unitary trial
procedure and the requirement that the defendant who elects to
testify must answer all questions precluded him from doing so.
Thus, he argued, he would be compelled to testify against
himself on the issue of guilt in order to exercise his right to
testify on the issue of punishment. Justice Harlan, who also
wrote the opinion in Simmons, called the reasoning of Simmons
into question to the extent that it was based on the theory of
a "tension" between constitutional rights. 100 He noted that the
Constitution does not forbid requiring a defendant to choose between rights-"the threshold question is whether compelling the
election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."'' 1 Turning to whether the unitary
trial procedure infringed the fifth amendment privilege, Harlan
concluded that no policies underlying the privilege were violated
when the defendant yielded to the pressure to testify, for the
pressure was no different from that inherent in the criminal trial
process. 10 2 Considering whether a defendant who remains silent
is deprived of any rights, Harlan assumed the existence of a due
process right to address the issue of punishment but concluded
that Ohio did not restrict that right. The defendant could freely
present evidence on the issue, and his counsel could argue to the
jury for mercy. The state was not required to permit the defendant to make a personal plea to the jury for mitigation of punishment. 10
If the Burger Court is basing its analysis in these cases primarily on the concept of compulsion, that concept seems to have
changed since the Warren Court decisions. The pressure placed
on the defendant in Jackson and Brady-coercion to plead guilty
by the desire to avoid the death penalty-and that in Simmons
and Crampton-sacrificing one constitutional right for anotherseem indistinguishable. The decisions can be explained only by
assuming that the Burger Court requires a showing of a higher
degree of coercion before proscribed compulsion will be found.
But the recent case of Brooks v. Tennessee'0 4 suggests that com100. Id. at 212.
101. Id. at 213.
102. Id. at 214-17.
103. Id. at 217-20.
104. 406 U.S. 605 (1972). In the later case of Baxter v. Pabnigiano,
425 U.S. 308 (1976), see text accompanying notes 47-51 supra, the penalty
analysis was considered inapplicable. The Court held that a prison disciplinary board's evidentiary use of a prisoner's refusal to testify did not
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pulsion may not be the Court's primary concern in these cases, for
Brooks returned to the type of analysis used in Griffin and struck
down a state trial procedure as a "penalty."
Brooks involved a state statute that required a defendant to
testify immediately after the close of the government's case,
before he presented any other evidence, or to forfeit the right
altogether. The Court recognized that the state had a legitimate
interest in preventing the defendant from adapting his testimony
to that of his witnesses, but found that the state's procedure
was "not a constitutionally permissible means of ensuring
his honesty."'0 5r It held the statute unconstitutional because,
as in Griffin, it imposed a penalty on the defendant's exercise
of his "initial" right to remain silent by depriving him of his
later right to testify in his defense. 106 Chief Justice Burger dissented, noting that the defendant did not testify at trial, and
the statute therefore did not compel him to do so.107 The only
burden on the defendant's choice of whether or not to testify
was the requirement that he choose at a particular time. Such a
burden, Burger reasoned, imposed to accommodate a legitimate
state interest, did not significantly increase the ordinary compul08
sion present in every criminal case.
Perhaps the apparent doctrinal confusion in the cases from
Brady to Brooks can be explained as a developing due process
penalize his exercise of the privilege. It distinguished Griffin by noting
that in that case a refusal to testify was used as evidence in a criminal
trial, not in a civil proceeding. While pressure on the accused would
exist in both cases, where the testimony is compelled in a civil proceeding, the privilege could still be protected by a motion to suppress in a
future criminal trial. Thus, evidentiary use of a valid exercise of the
privilege is a penalty only where such use occurs in a criminal proceeding. See also text accompanying notes 26-54 supra.
If this analysis of Palmigiano is correct, then, as there suggested,
425 U.S. at 334-35, if a grand jury witness is granted formal immunity
but refuses to testify, using his refusal as evidence against him at his
later criminal trial is not a penalty. Because he was granted immunity,
he could not properly invoke the privilege. Allowing the claim of privilege by a grand jury witness who is not formally granted immunity to
be used as evidence against him at his criminal prosecution seems to
present a due process question; the fairness of such a procedure might
depend on whether he was informed of the availability of informal
use immunity. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (silence after
Miranda warning). See generally Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 472,
475 (1975) (White, J., concurring); note 51 supra.
105. 406 U.S. at 611.
106. Id. at 611 n.6, 612.
107. Id. at 614.
108. Id. at 614-15.
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concept of constitutional rights as property rights. The state
may impose certain burdens or conditions on the defendant's
exercise of his rights where the state has a legitimate reason for
doing so. The defendant may therefore have to pay a price to
remain silent, or may choose to forego the right because the
price is too high. Where the state's goal is valid, and deterring
exercise of the right is only an incident of the state's procedure
rather than its primary purpose, 10 9 the defendant can be required to either pay or lose his right. The guiding principle of
decision in these cases-the general due process considerations
of fairness and decency-would apply whether or not the
defendant actually testified. This analysis thus focuses not on
delineating the degree of compulsion assumed to be inherent in
certain trial proceedings, but on a balancing of state and individual interests. It may permit the Court to avoid the appearance
of arbitrariness involved in finding that a certain set of circumstances does or does not result in compulsion violative of the
privilege.
It is not yet clear, however, which analysis-property right
or degree of compulsion-the Burger Court will adopt. In the
end, which analysis the Court chooses, or whether it chooses at
all, may not have great significance. If the Court reasons that
the fifth amendment prohibits only a certain degree of compulsion, it is likely to find acceptable any particular price the state
may impose to further its legitimate goals. And the acceptable
degree of compulsion may in turn depend on the strength of the
societal interest involved, and the apparent fairness of the criminal process at issue. It is clear, however, that either analysis
could be used to expand the range of permissible government
conduct with respect to individuals within the criminal justice
system.
B.

APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE TO AN ACCUSED

1.

Compulsion Exerted at Police Interrogations

The Burger Court's treatment of the Miranda rule 1 0 is
important both because it has specific implications for the ultimate fate of the rule itself, and because it sharply illuminates
several of the familiar themes underlying the Court's approach
109. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 & n.20 (1973);
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 615 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); note 212 infra.
110. See notes 136-46 infra and accompanying text.
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to the fifth amendment privilege. The Court's changing concept of compulsion, its tendency to rely on flexible due process
standards to protect rights that are intertwined with the privilege, and its balancing of individual and societal interests, are all
reflected in the cases dealing with the precedent set by Miranda
v. Arizona."' In order to fully understand the Court's approach, it is necessary to review the background to the Miranda
decision itself.
The fifth amendment provides not only the right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination, but the right to due process
of law. Few Supreme Court cases dealt with allegedly involuntary confessions prior to the twentieth century, 1 2 but in 1897 in
Brain v. United States, 1 3 the Court implied that coerced confessions were to be analyzed under the self-incrimination clause:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, whereever
[sic] a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."114
Despite this language, however, many viewed the privilege as
inapplicable to police interrogations that resulted in confessions." 5 Since the privilege was not held to apply to the states
until 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan," 6 and was viewed in federal
cases as protection against legal compulsion, such as court orders requiring an accused to testify,1 7 police practices were for
111. 384U.S. 436 (1966).
112. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896);, Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
113. 168U.S. 532 (1897).
114. Id. at 542.
115. See McCoRmvcK, supra note 61, § 125 &sources cited at 266 n.62;
8 WiGmoRE, supra note 17, § 2252, at 329 & n.27.

See generally Note,

Developments in the Law--Confessions,79 HARV. L. REv. 935 (1966).
116. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
117. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was the first case in which the
Court held the privilege against compelled self-incrimination applicable
to an accused in custody who was subjected to police interrogation. Between Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), and Miranda there
were some federal cases suggesting that the privilege applied to confession cases, see Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963);
Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Hardy v. United States, 186
U.S. 224 (1902), but Mirandawas the first clear holding on the issue.
Until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), state coerced confession
cases were treated under the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
Malloy was said to perform "a shotgun wedding of the privilege to the
confessions rule." Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on
Police Interrogations,25 Owo ST. L.J. 449, 465 (1964).
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some time tested under due process standards in both state and
federal cases.
Brown v. Mississippi"8 was the first case the Court decided
that involved interrogation by state, rather than federal, police.
Brown's conviction for homicide, based on a confession obtained
through physical torture, was reversed; Brown had been deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
due process clause because his conviction was grounded on untrustworthy evidence. In the next thirty years, there were
over thirty decisions involving allegedly coerced confessions. It
was during these years that the "voluntariness" doctrine matured. The Court was first concerned with confessions coerced
by physical brutality, 1 9 but soon began to disapprove the use of
psychological coercion as well. 120 Various police interrogation techniques were scrutinized to determine whether they
deprived the accused of his "free choice to admit, to deny, or
to refuse to answer.' 12' That the trustworthiness or reliability of
a confession was not the Court's major concern is illustrated by
cases such as Spano v. New York.122 In Spano, the police had
used sophisticated interrogation techniques to induce a confession, including having a policeman who was a childhood friend
of the accused play on his trust and arouse his sympathy by
falsely saying his job was in jeopardy. In reversing Spano's
conviction, the Court noted that society's aversion to involuntary
confessions turns on a "deep-rooted feeling that the police must
obey the law," lest life and liberty be endangered by the police
methods themselves. 23
118. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
119. See, e.g., White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
120. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
121. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
122. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
123. 360 U.S. at 320-21. For other examples of court condemnation
of police trickery, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (defendant
falsely told that a co-defendant had confessed to robbery and said that
defendant was the one who shot the victim); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 528 (1963) (police falsely told defendant that she would lose public
assistance and custody of her children unless she cooperated, in which
case they would recommend leniency); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961) (police chief falsely told defendant that he was going to take defendant's wife into custody).
The present Court seems to have a greater tolerance for trickery,
judging from Oregon v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (police falsely
told defendant that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the
burglary), Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (police falsely told
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The confession cases thus involved two different notions of
due process: it offends due process to secure a conviction on the
basis of untrustworthy evidence, and more importantly, police
conduct that offends "the community's sense of fair play and
decency '1 24 violates the due process guarantee. 1 25 The latter
notion of due process is the basis of most of the involuntary
confession cases, but it is a difficult standard to apply. In
Rochin v. California,1 2 6 for example, the police saw the accused
swallow something immediately prior to his arrest. He was
taken to a hospital where his stomach was forcefully "pumped"
for evidence of possession of narcotics. Justice Douglas, who
thought the case should have been decided by applying the privilege against self-incrimination, stated aptly in his concurring
opinion the difficulty of finding a due process violation:
The evidence obtained from this accused's stomach would be admissible in the majority of states where the question has been
raised ....

Yet the Court now says that the rule which the ma-

jority of the states have fashioned violates the "decencies of civilized conduct." To that I cannot agree. It is a rule formulated
by responsible courts with judges as sensitive as we are to the
proper standards for law administration.127
In many of the coerced confession cases, the finding that
"community standards of fair play and decency" were offended
by police conduct can be readily disputed. The hanging and
beating in Brown v. Mississippi128 surely constitutes such an
affront, but does it really offend civilized standards of decency to
defendant that a co-defendant had confessed to participation in a homicide but had named defendant as the one who had actually shot the victim), and Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (police falsely told defendant that they had arrested defendant's alibi witness who had confessed to participation in the crime), in which the Court upheld the convictions without criticizing the police trickery involved.
124. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
125. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) is a good example of
a recent case in which the Court confused the notions of due process
and compulsion. The defendant alleged that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because he was tried in prison garb, which
denigrated the presumption of his innocence. The Court, saying that
wearing that garb was not inherently prejudicial, held that the defendant would have been denied due process only had the state "compelled" him to wear the clothing. Since the defendant failed to object
to the situation at trial, the Court found no governmental compulsion
but rather a waiver by the defendant, even though he may have been
unaware of any right to be tried in civilian clothes. See also id.at 515
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
127. 342 U.S. at 177-78.
128. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See text accompanying note 118 supra.
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refuse to allow an accused to call his wife until he has signed a
confession? 129 Does it offend the community's sense of fair
play when, instead of supplying a doctor to treat the suspect's
sinus attack, the state sends in a psychiatrist whose skilled and
subtle questioning leads to a confession? 130 Perhaps in answering these questions affirmatively, the Court was accurately
assessing the community's sense of justice, but it is more likely
that the Court was grafting onto due process the concept of
31
compulsion underlying the privilege against self-incrimination.1
The language of many of the cases supports this assumption.13 2 In Rogers v. Richmond, 3 3 for example, the Court said

that when a defendant has been "subjected to pressures to
which, under our accusatorial system, an accused should not be
subjected," the due process clause has been violated. Moreover,
in the voluntariness cases, the Court was concerned not only
with police conduct, but with the subjective state of mind of the
accused.' 3 4 The latter is much more important in determining
whether the accused was actually "compelled" to incriminate
himself by police action than in determining whether police conduct offends civilized standards of decency. When the Court in
Malloy held that the self-incrimination privilege applied to the
states, it seemed to admit that its more recent coerced confession
cases 35 were primarily concerned not with due process but with
the privilege itself.
The first case to hold that the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination applied to police interrogation techniques was
Miranda v. Arizona. 3 6 In each of the four companion cases in129. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
130. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
131. The privilege was held applicable to the states in 1964 in Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
132. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
133. 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).

134. See National Legal Aid and Defender Association Newsletter, Sept. 1965, for a breakdown of the factors affecting voluntariness in 27 confession cases decided prior to Miranda.
135. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964), where, after noting
the distinction between the due process rationale of Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936), and the compulsion rationale of the federal cases
beginning with Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court
discussed the abandonment of the distinction and the marked shift to
the federal standard in state cases beginning with Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219 (1941). Compare Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14, 15 n.1 & 17-20 (1964) with the Court's position in Malloy v. Hogan, supra.
136. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). One week after the Malloy decision, the
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volved in Miranda,the defendant had been arrested, taken to the
police station, and interrogated for various lengths of time-only
two hours in Miranda's case. In each case the police secured confessions that were used at trial to obtain a conviction. And in
each case the Court held that the confession was compelled from
the accused in violation of the privilege. After discussing police
interrogation techniques and police manuals explaining the use
of psychological legerdemain to secure a confession, 137 the
Court, recognizing that the confessions might not have been involuntary in traditional terms,1 38 stated the premise on which the
opinion is based:
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege
apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officials during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak. 39
Having found that compulsion was inherent in custodial interrogation, the Court proceeded "to give concrete constitutional
'
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."'

40

To offset the inherent compulsion, the Court devised procedural
safeguards: police must, prior to any questioning, advise an
accused of his rights 41 and secure an express waiver of those
rights. Admitting that the Constitution did not require adherence to any particular solution to the problem, the Court nevertheless stated that the specific warnings and waiver procedure
must be observed at least until "other procedures which are at
least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it"' 42 could be shown. The Court considered the safeguards
Court, in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), dealt with a police
interrogation case in which the application of the privilege was again
mentioned. The court, however, limited the decision to the specific facts
of that case, the most important of which was that the suspect had asked
for and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer.
137. See generally F. INBAU & J. REm, CRIvNAL IwTERROGATION AND
CoNFEssiONs (2d ed. 1967).

138. 384 U.S. at 457.
139. Id. at 461.
140. Id. at 441-42.
141. The now familiar warnings were summarized by the Court as
follows: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. at 444.
142. 384 U.S. at 467. The Court encouraged Congress and the states
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fundamental to the privilege; 143 the compulsion to speak resulting from the coercive stationhouse environment and the nature
of the questioning'4 4 would be dispelled by the warnings to the
accused, who might otherwise think, out of ignorance or fear,
that he had to answer the questions.
to develop their own procedural safeguards. See 384 U.S. at 467, 490.
Interestingly, Congress enacted legislation in the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968), which, rather than establishing alternative procedural safeguards to insure the protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination, was an apparent attempt to overrule
Mirandaand reinstate the voluntariness standard.
143. 384 U.S. at 476.
144. The Court did not limit the necessity for Miranda warnings to
the stationhouse but required police to advise the accused of his rights
prior to "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted). The
accompanying footnote stated that "this is what we meant in Escobedo
when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused."
384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
This language was broadened in Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S.
1 (1968), and Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). In Mathis, a penitentiary inmate made incriminating statements to an Internal Revenue
Service agent who was conducting a routine tax investigation. The
Court held these statements inadmissible for failure to give Miranda
warnings even though the accused was in jail for an offense entirely separate from that under investigation. In Orozco, four police officers entered the suspect's room at a boarding house at 4 a.m., woke him up,
and began questioning him without giving Miranda warnings. It was
held that the accused was deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way and thus his statements had to be excluded from evidence.
Some commentators felt that the Court's next step would be to extend Miranda to situations where the citizen was interviewed in his house
by a revenue agent, since the nature of the questioning seemed to be
more important than the place of the questioning in determining the existence of psychological coercion. See, e.g., Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cn . L. REv.
671, 675-76 & n.25 (1968). The Burger Court has declined to so extend
Miranda, however, and has adopted a strict construction of "custodial
interrogation." See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
In another cutback of Miranda, the Burger Court summarily reversed an Oregon supreme court decision that had held that interrogation at police headquarters, behind closed doors, of a burglary
suspect who was told he was under suspicion for the crime but was
not arrested, was a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. The defendant's confession was held inadmissible because Miranda
warnings were not given. The Supreme Court's summary reversal
indicates that "custodial interrogation" will be defined very narrowly
indeed, apparently requiring actual arrest before Miranda warnings
are necessary, and thus permitting police, by the use of delaying
tactics, to induce a confession before arrest. See Oregon v. Mathiason,
275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977).

Compare

Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) with Mathis v. United States,
391 U.S. 1 (1968).

1977]

FIFTH AMENDMENT

If the police failed to give warnings and obtain a waiver,
Miranda disallowed the prosecution's use of any statements of
the accused, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, either in its
case-in-chief or on cross-examination:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation
and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not
be used without the full 45
warnings and effective waiver required
for any other statement.1
Miranda thus assured the accused of informal use immunity, a

1 46
familiar remedy for violations of the privilege.
Broad informal use immunity as a remedy for a violation of
Miranda, however, was short-lived. The Burger Court, in Harris v. New York, 47 held that, despite police failure to give full
Miranda warnings, the prosecution could use the defendant's
statements to impeach his testimony at trial. The Court asserted
that this was necessary to prevent uncontradicted introduction
of perjured testimony: "The shield provided by Miranda cannot
be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."' 48 This reasoning seems to assume the reliability or
trustworthiness of the earlier statement; indeed, the Court
pointed out that in the case at bar there was no claim that the
statements were coerced or involuntary. In short, the use of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda was not barred for
all purposes "provided of course that the trustworthiness of the
1
evidence satisfies legal standards.'

49

Three explanations for the Harris Court's reasoning seem
possible. First, established rules of evidence allow impeachment of a witness by prior inconsistent statements when he is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny such statements. 50
The theory underlying this rule is that a witness could not be
telling the truth on both occasions and such cross-examination
gives the jury a better chance to assess his credibility. While the
145.
146.
147.
148.

384 U.S. at 477.
See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
401 U.S.222 (1971).
Id. at 226.

149. Id. at 224. The Court acknowledged that certain statements in

Miranda could be construed as barring the use of uncounseled statements
for any purpose, but dismissed the language as unnecessary dictum. Id.
150. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 613; McCoamcx, supra note 61, §§ 34-38.
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Court's deference to this rule of evidence would be understandable, such a rule cannot supersede the fifth amendment's unqualified mandate.
Second, the Court may have engaged in a balancing process
to determine just what the fifth amendment protects against. In
recent cases the language of the Burger Court suggests that the
scope of the privilege may be determined by applying a test similar to that used in search and seizure cases, in which society's
interests in acquiring information and apprehending criminals
are weighed against the individual's interest in privacy. 151 For
instance, in Kastigar v. United States,1 52 the Court stated that
immunity is required if there is to be a "rational accommodation
between the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify." In Lefkowitz
v. Turley' 53 the Court indicated that the economic penalty
cases' 5 4 rested on a "reconciliation of the well-recognized policies
behind the privilege . .. and the need of the State, as well as
the Federal Government, to obtain information 'to assure the effective functioning of government."' 1 55 Finally, in Baxter v.
Palmigiano the Court declined to extend the Griffin no-comment
rule' 56 to a prison disciplinary proceeding where the accused refused to testify, partly because "disciplinary proceedings in state
prisons ... involve the correctional process and important state
157
interests other than conviction for crime."'
Unlike the fifth amendment however, the fourth amendment
prohibition is qualified: only "unreasonable" searches and seizures are proscribed. In Miranda,the Warren Court rejected the
argument that society's need for interrogation outweighs the
privilege; it indicated that the right to be free from compulsion
could not be abridged. 58 Nevertheless, while it is true that "the
Fifth Amendment does not distinguish among type or degrees
151. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 81 (1973); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). See generally Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), for a discussion of this balancing test in the search and seizure
context.
152. 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972).
153. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
154. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
155. 414 U.S. at 81 (quoting from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 55, 93 (1964)).

156. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
157. 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 4751 supra.
158. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1966).
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whether it prohibits "'inducement

of any

sort"' as suggested by Justice Brennan' 6° and Brain v. United
States,'61 is not clear. The Burger Court may thus be using the
concept of "compulsion" to insert a balancing test into fifth
amendment adjudication: the degree of compulsion exerted on
an individual is weighed against society's need for the information. Harris, in distinguishing a violation of Miranda from a
coerced or involuntary confession, may have used such a balancing process. The logical extension of that approach, however,
is drastic; it would seem to permit the Court to find that even
though the privilege was infringed, the need for the statements
obtained excused the constitutional violation.
Third, and most probable, the Burger Court may simply have
reasoned that violating Miranda does not necessarily violate the
privilege. The state could not use pre-trial statements obtained
in violation of the fifth amendment against a defendant at trial,
whether in the case-in-chief or on cross-examination, 6 2 but could
use statements elicited in violation of Miranda. That the Court
was implicitly making this distinction in Harris is evidenced by
its reference to the absence of a claim that the statements were
coerced or involuntary.'0
159. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 333 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (quoting from Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548
(1897)).
161. 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897).
162. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). See also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), where the Court, in deciding
whether earlier statements of the defendant used by the prosecution to
impeach his trial testimony were obtained in violation of the privilege,
apparently assumed that if the privilege were violated, impeachment use
was forbidden.
163. If this is not the meaning of Harris, then it would seem that
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), is in for some pruning.
Under that decision, a grand jury witness given use immunity can be
compelled to testify about his criminal activities because the testimony
cannot be used against him in a criminal prosecution in any way, either
directly or indirectly. If Harris means that statements compelled from
an accused in violation of the privilege can be used in a derivative fashion to impeach a defendant at his trial, it would seem to follow that
statements compelled from an immunized witness by the threat of incarceration for refusal to answer could be used to impeach that witness at
his criminal trial. The only distinction seems to be that there is informal
use immunity in one case and formal use immunity in the other, a distinction without import. The "use and derivative use" immunity of Kastigar would have to be changed to "direct use" immunity.
It is noteworthy that several state courts in interpreting their own
state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination have refused to
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In Michigan v. Tucker 164 the Court explicitly distinguished
between a violation of Miranda and a violation of the privilege.
Prior to interrogation the police had given the defendant, arrested for rape, three of his four Miranda warnings, but failed to
inform him of the right to have counsel appointed if he was
unable to afford a lawyer. The defendant indicated that he
understood his rights and did not want an attorney. In reply to
police questioning, he stated that he was with a friend at the
time of the rape. When the police contacted the friend, he
provided, rather than an alibi, information implicating the defendant in the crime, and the friend's testimony was introduced
at trial. Tucker argued that this was a forbidden derivative use
of his own compelled statement to the police.
The Court disagreed, finding that the Miranda procedural
safeguards had been disregarded, albeit inadvertently, but that
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination had not been
infringed. In distinguishing a violation of Miranda from a violation of the privilege, the Court said that the latter must involve
an element of coercion.1 5 The Court gave examples of coerced
confession cases involving "severe pressures" that were not comparable to any pressures involved in Tucker's case 16 6 and spoke
of involuntary statements as if they were the equivalent of state167
ments obtained by police compulsion.
In both Harris and Tucker, the Court seems to be reasoning
that a statement must be involuntary before its use will contravene the fifth amendment guarantee. This appears to be an outright rejection of Miranda's finding that the compulsion inherent
in custodial interrogation violates the privilege. The Miranda
safeguards were necessary in order to dispel the inherent compulsion; in Harris and Tucker, the Court found no compulsion even
though Miranda safeguards were disregarded. The existence of
follow the Harris result. See cases cited in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308, 339 n.1O (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
164. 417 U.S.433 (1974).
165. Id. at 448.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 445, 448-49. The Court used a similar analysis the
following year in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975), which
upheld impeachment use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda:
"There is no evidence or suggestion that Hass' statements ... were
involuntary or coerced. He properly sensed, to be sure, that he was
in "trouble"; but the pressure on him was no greater than that on
any person in like custody or under inquiry by any investigating officer." See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
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coercion apparently depends on the existence of factors in addi168
tion to custodial questioning itself.
If the fact of custodial interrogation and its accompanying
psychological pressures does not alone violate the privilege and
additional coercion must be shown, then the procedural safeguards required by Miranda are not "fundamental with respect
168. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976), rev'd,
97 S. Ct. 711 (1977); note 144 supra. The treatment of the concept of
deterrence in Harris and Tucker also illustrates the Burger Court's
distinction between Miranda and the privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional police detention is regarded as an appropriate remedy
to deter future violations. In Harris the Court rejected the argument
that impeachment use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda
would encourage impermissible police conduct; it reasoned that "sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case-in-chief." 401 U.S. at 225. Similarly,
the Court in Tucker reasoned that derivative use of information obtained
as a result of a good faith violation of Miranda was permissible; prohibiting such use would do little to deter improper police conduct. 417 U.S.
at 446-48. Since the interrogation at issue in Tucker had taken place
before the Miranda decision, the deterrence rationale lacked force: the
police had acted in complete good faith. The Court also refused to apply
the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963), to exclude the evidence because no abridgement of
the defendant's constitutional privilege had occurred. 417 U.S. at 44566. Had the fifth amendment been violated, the principle underlying
Kastigarwould seem to forbid derivative use of the statement. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972); Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
The reasoning of these cases is similar to that used in United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), where the Court found that although
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment could not be
used at trial, it could be used at a grand jury hearing; applying
the exclusionary rule to such proceedings would have no significant
"incremental deterrent effect." Id. at 351. While this reasoning may
be appropriate when applied to fourth amendment privacy interests or
to due process violations, it cannot logically be applied to the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See United States v.
Janis, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3027 (1976), which distinguishes the fourth amendment exclusionary rule remedy from the "direct command" of exclusion
in the fifth amendment. The exclusionary rule is only a partial
remedy for violation of the search and seizure rules. When the police fail to satisfy the reasonableness requirement the fourth amendment
is violated; suppression of the fruits of the search does not prevent or
undo the illegality. When the police compel the accused to make
incriminating statements, however, his privilege against self-incrimination is not yet infringed; it is only when these statements are used
against him at trial that a violation occurs. See text accompanying note
28 supra. Thus, prohibiting use of the compelled statements prevents
a violation of the privilege. If, in violating Miranda, the police do not
necessarily violate the privilege, then the Court's discussion of deterrence
makes sense only if the Court is honoring or creating an exclusionary
rule for violation of the Mirandasafeguards alone.
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to the Fifth Amendment privilege."'169 Rather than being coextensive with the scope of the privilege, the safeguards amount
to no more than a protective device or "prophylactic standard" to
guard against possible future compulsion. 170 The Court has created similar protective devices for use in lower federal courts' 7 '
on the basis of its supervisory power to promulgate such rules
in the absence of a contrary statute. But in state cases the Court
has no supervisory power. 72 Unless the Constitution furnishes
some basis for the Miranda rules, the Court cannot impose
them on the states. 173 Harrisand Tucker may therefore be seen
as cautious steps in the direction of overruling the 10-year-old
74
Miranda decision.1
Whatever may be the ultimate implications of Harris and
Tucker, they at least demonstrate the Burger Court's rejection of
the inherent coercion notion and a willingness to undertake a
169. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
170. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 443, 446 (1974).
171. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942). McNabb and Mallory require exclusion in federal courts of any statement obtained by the police from an
arrestee during a period of "unnecessary delay" between his arrest and
presentment before a magistrate.
172. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 462-63 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). See generally Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 717-

18 (1949).

173. Referring once again to the discussion of deterrence in Tucker,
see note 168 supra, if there is, as the Court finds, no violation of the
Constitution, then the only possible unlawful police action to be deterred

is a violation of the prophylactic safeguards of Miranda. But if the safe-

guards are not required by the Constitution and are not the result of
a proper exercise of the Court's supervisory power, then the police are
being deterred from doing something the Court has no power to prevent
them from doing in the first place.

174. See, e.g., Kent, Harris v. New York-The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder?, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357 (1971); Pelander, Michigan
v. Tucker: A Warning About Miranda, 17 ARiz. L. Rmv. 188 (1975).
Last term, the Court had an opportunity in Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), to overrule Miranda. In Beckwith two Internal Revenue Service agents had gone to a private home where Beckwith
occasionally stayed and questioned him for three hours regarding the
possibility of criminal tax fraud. The issue presented was whether certain statements Beckwith made during the interview should be suppressed since the full Miranda warnings were not given. Rather than
overruling Miranda or clarifying Harris and Tucker, the Court held that
this questioning was not custodial and therefore the warnings were not
required. The Court recognized that coercion could be present in noncustodial interrogation but found none in this case. This term the Court

once again had the opportunity to overturn Miranda in Brewer v. Wil-

liams, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287 (1977), but, in a 5-4 decision, avoided the issue
by deciding the case on other grounds.
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75
a
case-by-case determination of the presence of coercion,
76
process similar to the pre-Miranda voluntariness cases.'
Whether or not the accused was given his Miranda warnings
would be only one factor to be considered in judging whether
the police had exerted compulsion sufficient to trigger constitutional protection. 177 Even if the accused were completely ignorant of his rights, it would seem that he could still voluntarily,
178
that is, without compulsion or coercion, confess.

175. See generally United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 591 (1968)
(White, J., dissenting).
176. See text accompanying notes 113-30 supra.
177. See generally Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48
(1976); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
178. This was recognized in Miranda itself with regard to the person
not yet in custody or deprived of his freedom of action in a significant
way, but subjected to police questioning as a part of the investigation
of a crime. 384 U.S. at 477. The Court also stated that volunteered
statements and confessions remain "a proper element in law enforcement." Id. at 478.
The Burger Court took an analogous approach a year before the
Tucker decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The
issue was whether the prosecution must demonstrate that a person who
consented to an otherwise illegal search of his person or property was
aware that he had a right to refuse consent. The easiest if not the only
way to demonstrate clearly the existence of such knowledge would be
to advise the suspect of his right to refuse and secure his express waiver.
The Court has long been concerned that the suspect's "consent" to search
might be nothing more than his submission to a claim of lawful authority. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 1D (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921). In other words, the consent might have been either physically or psychologically coerced, thus rendering the search not truly a
product of "voluntary" consent. Schneckloth held that a showing of a
knowing and intelligent waiver by the suspect was unnecessary, because
the underlying policies of the fourth amendment were satisfied as long
as the suspect's consent was "voluntary" according to the definition developed in the confession cases. The fourth amendment is concerned
with police intrusion into privacy; balancing society's interests against
the interest of individual privacy, such an intrusion is acceptable when
there is a valid search warrant and in certain other circumstances, including warrantless consent searches. See note 151 supra and accompanying text. While a man's home is his castle, he can surely allow
others to enter it; as long as he consents freely, even if he was unaware
of his right to refuse entry to the police, a warrantless search is valid.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). His lack of
knowledge will only be one factor in making the voluntariness determination. Consent search cases must therefore be reviewed on a caseby-case basis, examining all of the circumstances-a review similar to
the "totality of the circumstances" test for voluntary confessions. See,
e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 199 (1957).
Once the notion of inherent coercion is rejected, the same analysis
is applicable to stationhouse interrogations, for, as Justice Marshall
stated in his dissent in Schneckloth:
[T]he information [conveyed by the Miranda warnings] is
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Penalizing the Exercise of the Right by the Evidentiary Use
of Silence in Custody

One facet of Miranda not yet restricted by the Burger
Court is the use at trial of the defendant's refusal to answer
questions at the police station. In Miranda, the Warren Court
stated:
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize
an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965); ...179
Although use at trial of the arrestee's silence to urge the
jury to draw an inference of guilt is precluded by Griffin, the
Burger Court was faced with the argument that stationhouse
silence can be used to attack a testifying defendant's credibility
in Doyle v. Ohio18 0 and United States v. Hale.18 ' The argument
rests both on the general principle of Harris that a defendant
should not be able to testify free from the traditional truthtesting devices available on cross-examination, and on the reasoning of an older case, Raffel v. United States'8 2 that the
defendant who elects to testify waives the privilege.
In Raffel, a government agent testified to an incriminating
statement made by the defendant, who did not take the stand to
deny the attribution. The trial ended in a hung jury. When
the agent repeated his testimony at the retrial, the defendant
took the stand and denied having made the statement. The
government impeached his testimony by noting that he had remained silent at the first trial. The Court, in allowing the impeachment, relied on the established rule that a defendant completely waives his immunity by offering himself as a witness.
The Court observed that the rule it was adopting would not
deter defendants from remaining silent at their first trial, because the possibility of a second trial would then seem remote,
intended only to protect the suspect against acceding to the
other coercive aspects of police interrogation. While we would
not ordinarily think that a suspect could waive his right to be
free of coercion, for example, we do permit suspects to waive
the rights they are informed of by police warnings, on the
belief that such information in itself sufficiently decreases the
chance that a statement would be elicited by compulsion.
412 U.S. at 281.
179. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
180. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
181. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
182. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
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and they would feel far greater pressure to testify at the first
trial from the83 possibility that the jury would infer guilt from
their silence.'
The government's efforts to extend Harris and Raffel to
permit impeachment use of stationhouse silence were unsuccessful; the Court did not reach the issue in either Hale or Doyle. In
Hale, the police had given the arrestee Miranda warnings and
he remained silent. The Court, resting its decision on its supervisory power over lower federal courts, held that the impeachment use of the accused's pretrial silence was improper because
the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its probative
value. In Doyle the police told the defendant that he had the
right to remain silent and that anything he said might be used
against him. Since this necessarily implied that his silence would
not be used against him, subsequent use of that silence as impeaching evidence was unfair and a denial of due process. The
majority cited Harrisapprovingly' 8 4 but did not mention Raffel.
Although the Court has thus been able to avoid ruling on impeachment use of stationhouse silence, it may be forced to decide
the issue if Mirandais ultimately overruled. If Mirandawarnings
are not required, 8 5 a case may arise in which the warnings were
not given and the prosecution, relying on Raffel, uses the accused's stationhouse silence to impeach his testimony. As Justice
Stevens noted in Doyle:
[U]nless and until this Court overrules Raffel v. United States
...I think a state court is free to regard the defendant's decision to take the stand as a waiver of his objection to the use
or his failure
of his failure to testify at an earlier proceeding
to offer his version of the events prior to trial.1 8 6
What the Court will decide when it faces this issue is uncertain.
Hale and Doyle might indicate an unwillingness to reject the
Raffel rationale. But there are a number of arguments, based
partly on the Burger Court's own decisions, against extending
Raffel even if Mirandais overturned.
First, unlike the defendant in Raffel, a person who has just
been arrested will be fully conscious of the strong possibility of a
jury trial. Knowing that his silence could be used against him
would pressure him to speak. This pressure is not merely that
183.
184.
185.
186.
senting)

Id. at 494-99.
426 U.S. at 617.
See text accompanying notes 169-74 supra.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 632-33 (1976)
(citation and footnote omitted).

(Stevens, J., dis-
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inherent in custodial interrogations; rather, it adds to the coercive environment. This additional coercion could be sufficient
to trigger the privilege.
Second, despite Raffel, a testifying defendant's waiver of his
right to silence does not perforce extend back in time to his invocation of the right to remain silent at the police station, for two
distinct rights are involved. The Court recognized in Leary v.
United States18 7 that a defendant who testifies at trial does not
retroactively waive his prior reliance on the privilege. Leary did
not waive his fifth amendment challenge to the Marijuana Tax
Act 1 88 when he testified about matters that he claimed he could
not be compelled to divulge under the Act's registration requirements. The right Leary asserted was "not the undoubted right
of an accused to remain silent at trial. rt is instead the right not
to be criminally liable for one's previous failure to obey a statute
which required an incriminatory act."'' 18
Similarly, the right
asserted by a testifying defendant who refused to answer questions at the police station is not the right of an accused to remain
silent at trial, but instead, the right not to have his previous
silence used as impeachment evidence against him.
Third, extension of Raffel to stationhouse silence would
clearly involve a penalty on an accused's exercise of the privilege. He would have to choose either to remain silent or to
answer police questions in order to preserve his right to testify at
trial without being impeached by his prior silence. This is
similar to the choice involved in Brooks v. Tennessee, 90 where
the defendant had to elect to testify at the outset of his case or
not at all, a procedure that impermissibly penalized him. The
defendant's right to silence at the stationhouse is similarly penalized by depriving him of the full benefits of his right to testify;
he cannot fully exercise both rights. 191
Despite these arguments, extension of Raffel to permit impeachment use of stationhouse silence would not be inconsistent
with the apparent philosophy of the present Court. If an accused
spoke to police, a mere allegation that he was compelled by the
fear that his silence would be used to impeach him might not
187.

395 U.S. 6 (1969).

188. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 560 (repealed by the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, title I, § 1101 (b) (3) (A), 84 Stat. 1292 (1970)).

189. 395 U.S. at 28.
190. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
191. See text accompanying notes 82-109 supra.
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be sufficient to show a violation of the privilege, particularly if
the Court, as it seems wont to do, examined the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether actual compulsion was
present. If an accused refused to speak to police, and chose to
testify at trial, the Court could hold that the state's interest in
preventing perjury outweighed his interest in precluding trial
use of his silence. Moreover, impeachment use of silence might
not be viewed as a penalty at all; the accused would be free to
testify if he felt his testimony was strong enough to withstand
the inferences that might be drawn from his previous silence.
C. THE RIGHT OF A WITNESS TO BE FREE OF COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION
Because the fifth amendment protects only against compelled
self-incrimination, a witness cannot invoke the privilege unless
his answers may tend to incriminate him. Thus, the ordinary
19 2
witness does not have an absolute right to refuse to testify;
the prosecution may freely interrogate him even on potentially
incriminating matters and it is up to the witness to assert his
fifth amendment rights. 193
Recently, in Garnerv. United States, 9 4 the Burger Court discussed the ordinary witness rule in a situation in which the wit192. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); United
States v. Korde], 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367 (1951).
193. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976). Although, theoretically, the jury, grand jury, or any other body before
whom the privilege is invoked could draw adverse evidentiary inferences from a witness's refusal to answer questions, the inferences do not
violate the fifth amendment because the exercise of the privilege is not
used as evidence in a criminal trial. See text accompanying notes 47-51
supra. Compare Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) with Griffin v.
California, 390 U.S. 609 (1965). This leads to a variety of interesting
questions beyond the scope of this Article: Can the defendant in a criminal prosecution call a person involved in the case to the witness stand
who will then invoke the privilege in front of the jury, refuse to answer
questions, and by inducing the jury to draw adverse inferences against
the witness shift blame away from the accused? Can the prosecutor call
a person to the stand who is so intimately involved with the defendant
(possibly a co-defendant being tried separately) that his claim of the
privilege in front of the jury and the adverse evidentiary inferences derived therefrom will damn the defendant by association? See generally
United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1053 (1974); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 671,
680-81 (1968).
194. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
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ness himself was the subject of the government's interrogation.
Garner was prosecuted for a conspiracy involving the use of interstate communication facilities for illegal gambling. The government attempted to impeach Garner by introducing income tax
returns on which he had reported substantial income from gambling. Garner argued that his tax return should have been excluded because his incriminating answers were compelled by the
threat of prosecution for failure to file a tax return. The Court
held that Garner, when filing his return, was in the position of
an ordinary witness and had to claim the privilege at the time of
filing; once the requested information was disclosed, the privilege
was lost. The Court quoted approvingly from United States v.
Monia:'95 "The Amendment speaks of compulsion. It does not
preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which
may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection of
the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to
have been compelled within the meaning of the Amendment."'196
Loss of the fifth amendment privilege by disclosure of information has been called "waiver," but, as stated in Garner,
the use of that term in this context is not analytically sound:
"[I] t seems desirable to reserve the term 'waiver' in these cases
for the process by which one affirmatively renounces the protection of the privilege .

,197
"...

The Court also stated that a

witness "may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a
knowing and intelligent waiver."1 98 Thus, a witness who is
unaware that he can refuse to answer incriminatory questions
apparently cannot subsequently argue for suppression of his
answers on the ground that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right. He may argue instead that his answer was
compelled, or "involuntary," but this argument is also unlikely to
succeed because the voluntariness of a witness's answers depends
on different considerations than the voluntariness of the answers
of an accused. 199
Garnerexplains the different type of analysis that is applied
to the ordinary witness's privilege. Since "the fundamental
purpose of the Fifth Amendment [is] the preservation of an
adversary system of criminal justice, '200 the privilege is not im195. 317 U.S. 424,427 (1943).
196. 424 U.S. at 654-55.
197. Id. at 654 n.9.
198. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-27, 23540, 246-47 (1973)).
199. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976).
200. 424 U.S. at 655.
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plicated unless the government's questioning subverts that system and becomes inquisitorial. In an inquisitorial process,
the purpose of questioning an individual is to secure evidence to be used against him at his own criminal prosecution.
"[T] he inquiring government is acutely aware of the potentially
incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought." 20 1 When the
government questions a witness for other purposes, however, the
integrity of the adversary system is not threatened. "Only the
witness knows whether the apparently innocent disclosure
sought may incriminate him, and the burden appropriately lies
with him to make a timely assertion of the privilege. If, instead,
he discloses the information sought, any incriminations properly
are viewed as not compelled. ' 20 2 Thus, Garner was not compelled
to be a witness against himself simply because he had to file
a tax return; income tax reporting is required of the public at
large and the government was unaware that Garner's particular
answers would be self-incriminating. Only after the witness
claims the privilege, putting the government on notice that the
answer may be incriminating, can compulsion in violation of the
fifth amendment arise, for it is at this point that the process
becomes inquisitorial.
Since, according to this analysis, there is no compulsion
until the witness claims the privilege, an assertion by a witness
who did not claim the privilege that his answers were "involuntary" will in most cases be unsuccesful. Such a witness is in the
same legal situation as a person who walks into a police station
and confesses to a crime. Thus, in discussing the voluntariness
issue, the Court pointed out that Garner could not claim that
his will was overborne by the government; he was under no pressure in completing his tax returns.2 0 3 Moreover, the threat of
prosecution for failure to file did not make his choosing to disclose "involuntary," for a timely privilege claim would have been
a defense to prosecution. 20 4 Apparently, the Court will consider
201. Id. at 657.
202. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
203. Id. at 657-58.
204. Garner also argued that even if a valid privilege claim would
be a defense to conviction, the threat of prosecution alone impermissibly
burdened his choice of whether to assert his rights. The Court rejected
this argument. Id. at 663-65.
Garner's situation was distinguished from the facts in Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S.
62 (1968), involving prosecutions for failure to file returns required of
gamblers in connection with occupational and excise taxes on gambling.
In those cases any disclosures made on such a return directed at a class
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answers involuntary only if a "witness" could have been prosecuted for invoking a valid claim to the privilege.
The explanation of the rights of a "witness" in Garner
seems reasonable as applied to the facts of that case, but the
Court's language is broad and not restricted to taxpayers. The
Garner analysis may be inapt in other contexts, especially when
a witness is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury. The
mere fact that he is called to testify often suggests some suspicion on the part of the government that he is somehow involved
in criminal activity;2 0 5 the witness may therefore be a virtual
defendant, and would seem to be entitled to protections more
analogous to those of an accused than those of an ordinary
witness.
Nevertheless, in United States v. Mandujano20 6 four members of the Burger Court applied the Garner witness rule to a
putative defendant, a man the prosecutor knew had attempted to
sell heroin to a government agent. Mandujano was subpoenaed
to testify before a grand jury investigating narcotics traffic in
San Antonio approximately six weeks after the attempted narcotics transaction. When questioned, he denied knowledge of
any narcotics traffic and further, denied the attempt to sell
heroin. A little over a month later, Mandujano was indicted for
attempting to sell heroin and for perjury before the grand jury.
The issue before the Court was whether the statements made to
the grand jury should have been suppressed in Mandujano's
perjury prosecution because he was not given Miranda warnings
20 7
prior to testifying.
The Court held that Mandujano had a duty to appear and
give testimony at the grand jury proceeding. He had no right to
answer untruthfully, however, and his testimony was properly
admitted in the perjury prosecution. 20 8 This holding is clearly
of persons suspected of criminal activities would be incriminating; thus,
those taxpayers were placed in the position of accused suspects and had
the right to remain silent or to refuse to fil the return.
205. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 102 (1964) (White,
J., concurring). Such suspicion is not necessarily present when a witness, for example, the police officer, a victim of a crime, or an accountant, is subpoenaed.
206. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
207. The prosecutor told Mandujano that he was required to answer
all questions that were not incriminating and that he could consult with
counsel outside the grand jury room. Although Mandujano stated he
could not afford counsel, the prosecutor did not say one could be provided for him. See id. at 567-68.
208. Id. at 576-77; id. at 584-85 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 609
(Ste Wart, J., concurring).
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correct; the fifth amendment does not include the privilege to
lie.209

The plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,

however, goes further, and indicates a willingness to apply the
Garner rule to all grand jury witnesses, whether or not the
prosecutor knows that the witness's answers may incriminate
210
him.
The plurality opinion reasons that the grand jury's need for
information requires that it be empowered to compel testimony
even from those suspected of criminal activity. 211 Thus, although

the fifth amendment protects against compulsion of self-incriminating testimony, "the witness must invoke the privilege ... as
the 'Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative
questions.' ",212 If the witness claims the privilege, the prosecutor can either go on to other questions or, after a judicial
determination that the claim is bona fide, grant immunity and
compel the witness to answer. If immunity is not conferred,
testimony compelled after a legitimate invocation of the privilege
may be suppressed when the government attempts to use it
2 13
against the witness in a criminal trial.
209. "Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government's right to ask questions-lying is not one of them. A citizen
may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot
with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood." Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969). See also United States v.
Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 82 (1969).
210. The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It does
not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters
which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been "compelled" within the meaning of the
Amendment.
425 U.S. at 574-75 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
211. 425 U.S. at 571-75.
212. Id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 433
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). This is similar to the language of
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 & rL20 (1973), where the Court
said that state procedures which have a legitimate purpose will not be
considered penalties on the exercise of a constitutional right even
if they incidentally deter the defendant from exercising the right. It is
when such deterrence is the only purpose of the state procedures that
an impermissible penalty exists.
If this sort of reasoning is carried over to the situation of the putative
defendant who is subpoenaed before the grand jury, the result may be
that as long as the prosecution does not subpoena him only for the purpose of gaining information to be used against him in a criminal prosecution, the putative defendant must answer the subpoena and testify,
claiming the privilege on a question-by-question basis.
213. 425 U.S. at 576.
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If the witness knows he can invoke the privilege, the procedure .outlined by the Chief Justice appears to afford adequate
protection against compelled self-incrimination. But if the witness does not know he can refuse to answer, he is faced with
something akin to the "cruel trilemma." Moreover, if the prosecutor is aware that truthful answers will probably incriminate
the witness, the witness's difficulty is, unlike the situation in
Garner, imposed with the state's knowledge. If the Garner
opinion's analysis of the reasons for the difference between the
rights of a witness and those of a defendant is correct, then it
would seem appropriate to distinguish a putative defendant
called before a grand jury from other witnesses. Possibly the best
method for determining whether a witness is a putative defendant would be to apply the objective standard of probable cause
for arrest.214 The putative defendant should be given formal immunity, or, at the very least, be advised of his right to refuse
to answer questions, thus avoiding the creation of an inquisitorial
process. Mandujano could be considered consistent with this
analysis and with Garner because the warnings given to Mandu2 15
jano were sufficient to ensure that he knew of the right..
Nevertheless, the plurality opinion does not appear to view
knowledge of the right as constitutionally required. The appeals court had held that Mandujano's statements to the grand
jury should have been suppressed because he was not given
Miranda warnings.2 1 6 The plurality rejected this approach, saying that the Mirandastandards "were aimed at the evils seen by
the court as endemic to police interrogation of a person in
custody," and should not be applied to judicial inquiries where
the presence of impartial observers diminishes the potential for
prohibited coercion. 21 7 This view is consistent with the Court's
apparent rejection of the inherent compulsion notion. Although,
as Justice Brennan points out, the grand jury's exercise of its
power to compel attendance and testimony is a "classic instance
of judicial compulsion, '218 it does not rise to the level prohibited
by the fifth amendment unless it actually compels the witness
to answer the incriminating questions. Thus, the issue becomes
whether the grand jury witness gave his incriminating answers
214. Suggested by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in
Mandujano. Id. at 598.
215. See note 207 supra.
216. United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974).
217. 425 U.S. at 579.
218. Id. at 592 n.7 (concurring opinion).
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voluntarily. 1" This analysis raises the difficult issue of the witness's subjective state of mind, and will probably involve 22the
0
Court in a case-by-case analysis of "voluntariness" once again.
IV.

CONCLUSION

What has the Burger Court left of fifth amendment protections to the individual? What direction will the Court take in
the future? These are not easy questions to answer because of
the Court's piecemeal approach to the privilege. It has given
219. The consideration of whether an answer in such a situation was
"voluntary" is different than the "voluntary" answer given by an ordinary witness discussed in Garner. See text accompanying notes 203-04
supra. There, all answers of a witness were considered voluntary because the government did not know they might be incriminating;
here, the government's knowledge of the possible incriminating nature of the answers makes the quest inquisitorial. Consider the situation of a police officer questioning bystanders at the scene of the
crime. A general "what happened?" question could not result in an
involuntary answer. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966).
But when a bystander replies, "I shot him," further questioning by the
police may result in answers that are involuntary or compelled.
The voluntariness determination could be more easily made if the
witness had counsel prior to and/or during the grand jury proceeding.
The court has previously suggested that an individual has a right to
counsel in order to effectively understand and claim his rights secured
by the privilege. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 468 (1975); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966). While such a right might include
the appointment of counsel in the case of an indigent defendant, the witness before a grand jury is probably entitled only to consult with retained counsel. In any event, it is clear that there is no sixth-amendment
right to counsel during a grand jury proceeding. See United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972); In re Gorban,352 U.S. 330 (1957).
220. The Court has accepted certiorari and heard argument in two
cases in which the issue is whether a witness before a grand jury must
be warned of his rights before being questioned. United States v. Washington, 328 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1974), cert. granted, 426 US. 905 (1976)
(No. 74-1106); United States v. Wong, No. 74-1636 (9th Cir., Sept.
23, 1974), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 905 (1976) (No.74-635). This question
was not reached in Mandujano,since some warnings had been given. 425
U.S. at 582 n.7. See note 207 supra. IfHarris,Tucker, and Bustamonte,
see notes 147-78 supra and accompanying text, indicate the direction the
Court will take, warnings will probably not be held constitutionally required.
The Court could constitutionally require warnings under the due
process clause to insure fair proceedings, see United States v. Wong, supra, rather than as a requirement imposed by the fifth amendment privilege. Or in Wong the Court could exercise its supervisory power over
federal courts to impose a non-constitutional requirement for warnings;
such a rule, however, would not be applicable to the District of Columbia
local courts involved in United States v. Washington, supra. See Griffin
v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 717 (1949).
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little guidance to lower courts, prosecutors, or police. But certainly the intermittent doses of restrictive interpretations disclose
a tendency to treat the patient by limiting his lifestyle.
When the issue is alleged pre-trial abuses, the privilege
apparently offers no protection against the state's act of compulsion; only use of the defendant's compelled testimony in his
criminal prosecution is forbidden. The Court may be moving
toward a rule that would allow the privilege to be claimed in
advance of trial only by a motion to suppress compelled testimony. The determination of the existence of compulsion prior to
trial would be necessary only in this context. Furthermore, the
Court has strictly limited the protection of private documents.
The government may seize a person's diary by executing a valid
search warrant or by issuing a subpoena commanding the person
to turn over his diary as long as that act of production is not
used as evidence of existence and possession of the diary or as
authentication evidence.
As for compulsion exerted on a defendant to take the stand
and testify at his criminal trial, the Court does recognize that
there are some procedures which, if allowed to stand, will impermissibly pressure a defendant to testify and will penalize the
nontestifyin'g defendant's exercise of his right. The pressure to
testify must be significantly different from that inherent in the
trial process, however, and the Court will apparently weigh the
jurisdiction's legitimate purpose for imposing the procedure in
determining whether it violates the privilege or due process.
The Court will apparently resolve the issue of compulsion
where the accused is subjected to police interrogation by examining the totality of the circumstances in each case for the
presence of coercion, as was done prior to Miranda. The
requirement of Miranda warnings prior to questioning may be
doomed. The Burger Court in Harris and Tucker indicated its
rejection of both the Warren Court's factual premise that compulsion is inherent in custodial questioning and its constitutional
premise that the fifth amendment requires that the government
give warnings and obtain a waiver prior to such questioning.
Advising an accused of his rights will return to its pre-Miranda
status as merely one factor to be considered in determining
coercion. Certain forms of psychological coercion, such as
honeyfogling and trickery by falsehood, recognized in the past as
being improper, may in the future be viewed as acceptable
government behavior, for the Court tends to require a higher
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degree of coercion to support a finding of impermissible compulsion. Indeed, it is conceivable that the Burger Court could
return to due process as the constitutional basis for exclusion of
police-coerced statements, and limit the protections of the privilege to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
Where an ordinary witness, one not an accused, answers
the questions of a government official, his responses are conclusively deemed voluntary or not compelled because there is no
inquisitorial process directed against him; the government is not
seeking evidence to be used against the witness in his criminal
prosecution. Apparently the same rule may hold true even
when the witness is a putative defendant, although it would seem
that the Court will have to determine the intent of the prosecutor
more carefully. If the government's only purpose, or possibly
one of its purposes, in questioning the witness is to obtain
evidence to be used against him in his criminal prosecution, then
the court must treat him as an accused and determine whether
his answers were compelled. Warnings given to such a witness
may tend to dispel any coercion and thus be one factor in making
the determination, but it is not likely that warnings will be constitutionally required.
It seems that the Burger Court is seeking to arrive at a
literal interpretation of the fifth amendment: a rule that the
privilege simply protects the right of a criminal defendant not to
take the stand and not to have statements, previously compelled
from him, introduced into evidence against him at trial. While
this approach may give the government more investigative alternatives in detecting and apprehending criminals, it does so by
sacrificing one of the protections that shield the individual from
his much stronger adversary. It is no accident that the selfincrimination clause became known as a "privilege." Like other
privileges, it protects and fosters a particular relationship
deemed worthy of protection-the relationship between an individual and his government--even at the expense of losing reliable evidence. Individual human dignity will surely suffer if the
Court continues to restrict the protection offered by the fifth
amendment and to ignore its role as a bulwark against abuses
of governmental power unimagined by the framers of the Constitution.

